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SCRAPING SOME MOSS FROM THE
OLD OAKEN DOCTRINE:
ELECTION BETWEEN
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS AND DISCOVERY OF
THEIR NET WORTH
MICHAEL L. RICHMOND*
How dear to some hearts is the old oaken doctrine
Of the misinformed plaint)ifs election to sue
The contracting agent or undisclosed principal
Whom research or fortune presents to full view.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The responsibility of undisclosed principals for the con-
tracts of their agents and the vicarious liability of masters for
the torts of their servants spring from the same soil. In
neither case have analysts propounded a viable legal theory
for the doctrine,2 yet few would debate the commercial ne-
cessity of either.3 In each instance, the roots lie deep in the
soil of mercantile practice.
In the nascent stages of a new era of an expanded and
increasingly complex business environment, courts devel-
oped legal doctrines to mirror commercial reality. Courts,
* A.B., Hamilton College, 1967; J.D., Duke University, 1971; M.S.L.S., Univer-
sity of North Carolina, 1974; Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for
the Study of Law, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
The assistance of colleagues around the country proves invaluable to authors. In
this regard, the author wishes to acknowledge his deep debt to Professor J. Dennis
Hynes of the University of Colorado School of Law for his thoughtful criticism of the
manuscript.
1. Merrill, Election (Undisclosed Agency) Revisited, 34 NEB. L. Rav. 613, 613
(1955).
2. See infra notes 15-29, 34-42 and accompanying text.
3. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 543-45 (1961); Wright, Undisclosed Princpal in California, 5 CALIF. L.
Rv. 183, 184 (1917).
4. An early example is the subsuming of the law merchant by common law courts
having a jury of merchants establish mercantile custom, which the courts then ap-
plied. "In this way the common law began to capture the field of mercantile affairs,
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however, have long acknowledged their ineffectiveness in
determining matters of economic theory. For example, the
business judgment rule specifically bars courts from review-
ing the commercial wisdom of decisions of corporate offi-
cials,5 although courts may look behind the decisions to
discover fraud or self-dealing.6 Thus, although the doctrines
themselves may provide the necessary legal mechanism for
maintaining the free flow of commerce, when they interact
with doctrines supported by purely legal reasoning, inconsis-
tencies result. One such inconsistency occurs where a tort
plaintiff may recover a judgment against both principal and
agent,7 but a contract plaintiff must elect against which of
the two the court will enter judgment.
Complicating matters further, a plaintiff in a civil action
can discover the net worth of a defendant prior to judgment
in only the most limited circumstances. 9 Accordingly, the
contract plaintiff must elect between principal and agent
with no real knowledge of which has the greater resources
and the better ability to pay a judgment. Proceeding simply
on the presumption that the principal has the "deeper pock-
et" often leads a plaintiff to the unpleasant dead end of an
unsatisfied judgment while the highly solvent agent goes
unchallenged.10
This article compares the theories of vicarious liability
and liability of an undisclosed principal for the contracts of
an agent, suggesting that courts have no theoretical basis for
but for a long time it regarded itself as administering a strange and foreign law." T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 663 (5th ed. 1956). See also
K. SMITH & D. KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 9-10 (4th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929) § 435 explanatory note, citedin Grinder v. Bryans
Rd. Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687, - 432 A.2d 453, 460-61 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as § 435 explanatory note].
5. Eg., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 11. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968). But see
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
6. E.g., State ex rel Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 373,
391 P.2d 979 (1964).
7. E.g., Cravens v. Lawrence, 181 S.C. 165, 186 S.E. 269 (1936).
8. Eg., National Marine Serv. v. C.J. Thibodeaux & Co., 380 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.
Tex. 1973).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 178-220.
10. "Moreover, one may question the expediency of a rule which makes just com-
pensation dependent upon the often blind guess of the plaintiff's attorney as to the
financial responsibility of the defendants and their susceptibility to service." 36
COLUM. L. REv. 324, 326 (1936).
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mandating election in the case of the undisclosed principal
but not in the case of vicarious liability. It then considers the
various procedural avenues within a lawsuit available to a
plaintiff seeking to discover the relative worth of the princi-
pal and the agent. Finally, assuming courts will continue to
require an election, it suggests the use of discovery to permit
a plaintiff to knowingly choose a defendant.
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF MASTERS
From the outset of the contemporary theory of vicarious
liability, courts acknowledged its equities. In Hem v. Nich-
ols" Chief Justice Holt held:
that the merchant was answerable for the deceit of his fac-
tor, though not criminaliter, yet civiliter; for seeing some-
body must be a loser by this deceit, it is more reason that
he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the de-
ceiver should be a loser, than a stranger: and upon this
opinion the plaintiff had a verdict.' 2
Thus, the formation of the doctrine lay in allocating the risk
of loss when an agent could not pay for his own torts. As
between the principal who employed the agent to do that
which the principal might otherwise take upon himself and
the third party, the principal would more appropriately bear
the loss.' 3 Of course, the principal would then have a right
to recover from his agent any loss he had paid the third
party, by a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty. 4 So, although the ultimate loss would indeed fall di-
rectly on the tortfeasor agent, if he could not pay the loss it
would fall on the principal who had employed him rather
than on the third party who incurred the injury.
Few would deny the fairness of this approach, yet for the
past ninety years authors have debated its theoretical under-
pinnings. To Oliver Wendell Holmes, the entire concept
flew in the face of common sense while retaining a certain
11. 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (K.B. 1709).
12. Id
13. Cf P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 353, at 240 (4th ed.
1952).
14. Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 327-28
(1896); Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177
(1874).
1983]
MA4RQ UETTE LA4W REVIEW[
logical consistency.' 5 While common sense might reject
making one person pay for the wrong of another, the logical
chain begun by quifacit per alium, facit per se 6 progressed
inevitably to the conclusion of vicarious liability in tort."
Professor Wigmore produced a definitive compilation of
those cases forming the historic basis of the rule and con-
cluded that vicarious liability simply presented an instance
where we "employ a fiction to sanction a rule which we thor-
oughly believe in, but lazily prefer to evade accounting for
openly and rationally. . . . [I]n short, the rule would have
stood substantially as it does now, if all reference to the
Idenitification fiction were wanting."' 18 Rather like pornog-
raphy, 19 then, vicarious liability stems from a theory which,
although undefinable, is readily recognizable. °
During ensuing years, commentators reached agreement
on only one point: that no viable legal theory to support vi-
carious liability met with their mutual approval.2' At the
same time, the pragmatic approach seemed irrefutable.2
"No one really desires to attack the private fortunes of asso-
ciated individuals; but it is eminently desirable that means
should be had of getting at the funds they collectively sub-
scribe, when legal--or illegal-results flow from their collec-
tive action. ' 23 Undeniably, the "deep pockets" approach,
which law in the grand manner denigrated,24 lay firmly at
the root of vicarious liability.
15. Holmes,Agency (pt. 2), 5 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1891).
16. "[A]n act within the power of the agent has the same legal effect as if done by
the principal." W. SaEvEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 56 (1964).
17. Holmes, supra note 15, at 14-16.
18. Wigmore, Responsibilityfor Tortious Acts: Its History (pt. 2), 7 HARV. L.
REv. 383, 399 (1894).
19. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
20. "It is quite true that we have no sure test of the ethical basis or economic
expediency ofrespondeat superior." Seavey, Speculations as to 'Respondeat Superior,"
in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 434 (1934).
21. "A number of explanations or justifications for the rule have been of-
fered. . . . None of these reasons is completely satisfying, though many of them con-
tain elements of truth." P. MECHEM, supra note 13, §§ 352-353.
22. Cf. Warax v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 72 F. 637, 643 (C.C.D. Ky. 1896).
23. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 125-26 (1916).
24. See P. MECHEM, supra note 13, § 352.
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Approaching the midpoint of the current century, the law
sought justification for its rules in other disciplines. 25 At the
forefront of the trend, Guido Calabresi took a new look at
vicarious liability and concluded that societal and economic
considerations mandated distribution of the risk of loss gen-
erated by a particular activity among the widest possible seg-
ments of society.26 Should the agent lack the ability to pay,
the principal should bear the initial loss directly, or through
insurance, redistribute it to his patrons over the succeeding
years through increased prices. This approach translated
as the "deep pockets" theory writ large-society as a whole
had the deepest available pockets.28  By searching for the
person most readily able to pay, the law had in fact over-
looked the obvious: that once it located him, he would sim-
ply redistribute the cost among his own clientele.
Thus, whether through the equitable concept that the
most appropriate result lay in placing the burden on the one
who had instigated the action, or through the pragmatic ap-
proach that the most appropriate result lay in placing the
burden on the one most able (or likely) to pay, vicarious lia-
bility came about as a dominating force in the law. For
whatever reason, loss has occurred. The principal of the per-
son creating that loss should bear its burden rather than the
unwitting third party.29 Viewed from a slightly different per-
spective, a person should not avoid liability for an act which
might yield him profit simply because a person other than
himself undertook that act.
25. Justice William O. Douglas attempted "to furnish an economic and social
basis for a rule of vicarious liability" as early as 1929. Douglas, Vicarious Liability
andAdministration of Risk 11, 38 YALE L.J. 720, 745 (1929).
26. Calabresi, supra note 3.
27. Professor Seavey also acknowledges this approach, believing the master will
take greater care in selecting his employees and will obtain liability insurance as a
cost of doing business. W. SEAVEY, supra note 16, § 83. See also H. REUSCHLEIN &
W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 52 (1979).
28. But see P. MECHEM, supra note 13, § 360.
29. It is simply on the ground of public policy, which requires that he shall be
held responsible for the acts of those whom he employs, done in and about his
business, even though such acts are directly in conffict with the orders which
he has given them on the subject.
Warax v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 72 F. 637, 643 (C.C.D. Ky. 1896).
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III. LIABILITY OF UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPALS
Attempts to rationalize the liability of undisclosed princi-
pals took a somewhat different tack. Most commentators ac-
knowledged that the basic rule lacked any true justification
in the law of contracts. However, they arrived at the same
conclusion-although lacking in underlying theory, the rule
made sense.
In Scrimshire v. Alderon30 a court first permitted an un-
disclosed principal of a contracting agent to sue the party
with whom the agent contracted. The seminal case dealing
with the obverse suit, Edmunds v. Bushell,31 found the undis-
closed principal liable in a suit by the third party since "[it
would be very dangerous to hold that a person who allows
an agent to act as a principal in carrying on a business, and
invests him with apparent authority to enter into contracts
incidental to it, could limit that authority by a secret reserva-
tion."' 32 Later cases agreed, stressing that the general law of
agency making the principal liable for all authorized acts of
the agent must govern.33
Undeniably, when viewed in the pure light of the basic
law of contracts these decisions make little sense.
The right of one person to sue another on a contract not
really made with the person suing is unknown to every
other legal system except that of England and America. It
rests originally on a sort of common law equity, and
originates in the feeling that a principal who had got the
advantage of a purchase ought to pay for it if the agent to
whom the seller really trusted was not able to do SO. 34
This statement of Sir Frederick Pollock has echoed in the
words of virtually all commentators, both British and Amer-
30. 93 Eng. Rep. 1114 (K.B. 1743).
31. 1 Q.B. 97 (1865).
32. Id at 100 (Mellor, J.).
33. Watteau v. Fenwick, I Q.B. 346, 348 (1893). A later case, however, refused to
extend the doctrine. In Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, 1901 A.C. 240, the prin-
cipal authorized its agent to purchase wheat at a certain price. The agent contracted
in his own name at a higher price than authorized, and the next day the principal
agreed with the agent to honor the bargain. Upon refusal of delivery by the principal
and agent, the seller sued the principal for nonperformance. The House of Lords
refused to permit the principal to ratify or be bound, holding that "an undisclosed
principal must exist at the time of the contract. He cannot be brought into life as a
principal after the contract has been made without any recognition of his existence."
Id at 251 (Lord James of Hereford). See also 7 A.L.I. PROc. 258 (1929).
34. 11 LAW. Q. REv. 358, 359 (1887).
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ican, who have discussed the topic.35 They recognize the
"anomaly" of the law, while at the same time applauding its
rough equity. Beyond this, however, the history of those
writers seeking to find a viable legal theory to support an
unchallenged equity has proven a study in futility.
Professor Ames suggested that the problem boiled down
to one of procedure-that courts should treat the matter as
an equitable attempt to levy on the right of exoneration held
by an agent against his principal.3 6 Professor Mechem, how-
ever, dismissed this proposal with one brief sentence in a
footnote: "Many practical objections to a remedy purely eq-
uitable will, however, at once suggest themselves. ' 37 He sug-
gested instead that:
If a principal sends an agent to buy goods for him and on
his account, it is not unreasonable that he should see that
they are paid for. Although the seller may consider the
agent to be the principal, the actual principal knows better.
He can easily protect himself. . . and if he does not, but
... voluntarily pays the agent without knowing that he
has paid the seller, there is no hardship in requiring him to
pay again. 38
This makes for a good rough justice, admittedly, but pro-
vides a painfully weak way of making practice accord with
the theory of the law of contracts. Another effort to square
the two came from William Draper Lewis,39 who maintained
that true liability in contract rested not on the promise made
by the contracting party but on the fact that the plaintiff had
changed his position on the basis of the defendant's activ-
ity.4° If correct, Professor Lewis arguably provided a theory
35. W. SEAVEY, supra note 16, § 56B; Ames, Undisclosed Principal-His Rights
andLiabilities, 18 YALE L.J. 443, 443-45 (1909); Ferson, Undisclosed Principals, 22 U.
CIN. L. REV. 131, 132-34 (1953); Mechem, The Liability ofan Undisclosed Principal,
23 HARv. L. REV. 513, 515 (1910); Wright, Undisclosed Principal in California, 5 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 183 (1917). But see Lewis, The Liability ofthe Undisclosed Principal in
Contract, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1909); Muller-Freinfels, The Undisclosed Principal,
16 MOD. L. REV. 299 (1953).
36. Ames, supra note 35, at 449-53.
37. Mechem, supra note 35, at 515 n.2.
38. Id. at 530.
39. Lewis, supra note 35.
40. Id. at 133. Even while attempting to find a rational basis in legal doctrine for
the rule, Professor Lewis acknowledges that even if undisclosed, the owner of a busi-
1983]
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of contract compatible with the liability of the undisclosed
principal. Unfortunately, his concept worked only in a frac-
tion of cases for breach of contract, for an essential element
of a contract is the identity of the contracting parties.4'
While Professor Lewis' theory suffices for cases brought
under the equitable theory of promissory estoppel,42 it fails
utterly under other applications of contract law.
At the same time that theorists found little ability to jus-
tify the rule in traditional law, they had to acknowledge its
soundness from a business viewpoint. With commendable
pragmatism, Austin Tappan Wright43 proposed that com-
mercial reality provided the courts with a perfectly valid
justification.
[J]ust as the business man's point of view is the only one
that satisfactorily furnished a test whether the relationship
of two or more persons is that of partners, so in cases where
the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal are in-
volved, the test to be applied should be that of the business
man's reasonable needs. . . . It will not be the first time
that judges have borrowed from the custom of merchants,
which is not law, of course, until sanctioned by decision. 4
Again, loss has occurred. Again, the law has seen fit to
allocate the loss as between the principal and the third party
to the principal, fully understanding that any ultimate liabil-
ity would come about only in the absence of the ability of
the agent to pay. Commercial necessity dictates the use of
middlemen to aid in the formation of contracts, and com-
mercial necessity likewise dictates that the ultimate con-
tracting party assume the liabilities as well as the burdens of
the contract.45 Otherwise, merchants will not accept the risk
ness must remain liable on its contracts. Id at 125-26. "The rule itself rests on neces-
sity." Id at 129.
41. "In fact the rule by which [the undisclosed principal] is made a party does
violence to a basic contract principle by which the personality of the parties is a term
of the agreement." W. SEAVEY, supra note 16, § 56B. See also 2 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 286, at 347 (3d ed. 1959).
42. See, e.g., Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 226 A.2d 708 (Del. 1967); United Elec. Corp.
v. All Serv. Elec., Inc., 256 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1977).
43. Wright, supra note 35.
44. Id at 184.
45. Lord Denning phrases his justification for the entitlement of an undisclosed
principal to sue the third party in these terms:
I mean the principle that a man who makes a deliberate promise which is
[Vol. 66:745
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of looking exclusively to a middleman whose ability to pay
presumptively falls short of that of his principal's. 46
To illustrate the propriety of treating the principal's lia-
bility identically in contract and tort, consider the following
situation. The owner of a hotel, desiring to build a small
addition, sends his handman to the lumberyard to purchase
lumber. The handyman, a regular employee of the owner
and a person who would under any definition be termed a
servant, contracts in his own name for a substantial quantity
of lumber which the yard will deliver as his own. In leaving
the yard in his own car, the handyman negligently damages
a truck belonging to the lumberyard. In neither instance did
the lumberyard have any indication that the acts of the
handyman were for any individual other than himself, in
neither instance did the lumberyard have a "choice" of par-
ties, yet in each instance the owner would incur the liability
for the acts of the handyman. In commerce, whether one
bears a loss in contract or in tort, one should have the oppor-
tunity of looking beyond appearances to reach the individ-
ual whose acts occasioned the circumstances from which the
loss came.
Essentially, the principle underlying vicarious liability
equates with that underlying liability of an undisclosed prin-
cipal. Although in neither case does the law provide a valid
theoretical basis for the rule, in both, the exigencies of com-
merce and the dictates of an abstract sense of justice demand
the result. The question, therefore, comes neither from the
jurisprudence of tort nor of contract; it lies firmly fixed in
that peculiar amalgam of law, equity and mercantile custom
which comprises the unique field of the law of agency.47 Ac-
intended to be binding... must keep his promise; and the court will hold him
to it, not only at the suit of the party who gave the consideration, but also at
the suit of one who was not a party to the contract, provided that it was for his
benefit and that he has a sufficient interest to entitle him to enforce it ....
Smith & Snipes Hall Farm Ltd. v. River Douglas Catchment Bd., [1949] 1 K.B. 500,
514. Conversely, the need for the third party to sue the principal also stems from the
same commercial necessity.
46. "It should be remembered that the contract was made for the benefit of the
principal. The agent must hold what he got in trust for the principal. A seller loses to
that extent the credit he relied on." Ferson, supra note 35, at 136.
47. "This result could not have been achieved unless the judges had decided in
harmony with the general principles underlying our jurisprudence and in response to
1983]
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cordingly, as the liability of a principal in tort seeks to foster
the same end as the liability of a principal in contract, the
judicial system has no justification in adopting different pro-
cedures to deal with each.
IV. ELECTION BETWEEN MASTER AND SERVANT
Just as the right to sue the undisclosed principal and his
agent stems from only one contract, so the right to sue the
master and his servant stems from only one tort.4 Even in
those areas where a plaintiff could sue the principal directly
for the alleged tort of the principal-negligent hiring,49 ul-
trahazardous enterprise, 50 nondelegable duty5' and the like
52
- the principal paid for the tort which the agent had in fact
committed. 3 These cases stemmed from the difficulty with
imposing direct liability for the torts of others in many in-
stances and represented an effort by courts to construct alter-
native avenues of reaching the principal when traditional
commercial necessity." Seavey, The Rationale ofAgency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 859
(1920), reprinted in W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 65 (1949).
48. "[I]n reality the master is not a tort-feasor at all; . . . the law identifies the
master with the servant for this purpose, and makes the servant's act the master's
. . . ." Raymond v. Capobianco, 107 Vt. 295, 302, 178 A. 896, 899 (1935) (citing
McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N.H. 169, 123 A. 229 (1923)).
49. Eg., Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Riddle v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 73 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1954).
50. E.g., Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 2 So. 2d 133 (1941); Ross v.
Heitner, 156 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
51. Nondelegable duty may be created by contract, as in Mills v. Krauss, 114 So.
2d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), or by statute, as in Mastrandrea v. J. Mann, Inc.,
128 So. 2d 146 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
52. Other examples include accidents caused by the principal's own negligent di-
rections to the agent, City of Mount Dora v. Voorhees, 115 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); accidents occuring due to hazardous conditions which the principal knew
would be created by the agent's activity, Maule Indus. v. Messana, 62 So. 2d 737 (Fla.
1953); Peairs v. Florida Publishing Co., 132 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
accidents stemming from the activity of an agent who performs a contract which calls
for his illegal or tortious activity, National Rating Bureau v. Florida Power Corp., 94
So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1956); and incidents following retention of an agent by a principal
who knew of the agent's dangerous propensities, Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 1954).
53. Of course, the principal would later have a cause of action against the agent
whose act occasioned the harm to the third party. Although not a true indemnifica-
tion claim, it would seem proper to raise it as a third-party cause of action as well.
Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d 10, 12 (1939). Cf W. SEAVEY, supra
note 16, § 155C; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 27, § 72.
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theory failed.54 Thus, whether through pure vicarious habil-
ity or through direct imposition of liability in the case of an
independent contractor or an act of a servant outside of the
scope of employment, the law of agency sought to provide
two or more sources to satisfy the demands of a tort
claimant.
Clearly, a principal and his agent can in no sense of the
term be considered joint tortfeasors.5 5 This concept is predi-
cated on the existence of two or more actors, each perform-
ing an independent tortious act. 6 The combination of the
acts results in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. 7 Rather
than have the plaintiff hazard the convoluted maze of fore-
seeability, the law permits the plaintiff to recover against
joint tortfeasors both jointly and severally,58 leaving the de-
fendants to allocate loss among themselves through such de-
vices as contribution 9 and indemnification.6 0
Nonetheless, courts overwhelmingly permit a plaintiff to
sue both a master and servant jointly in tort, recovering a
judgment against both.61 Indeed, they hold that a judgment
against one, so long as it remains unsatisfied, will not bar a
judgment against the other. 2 In reaching this result, courts
acknowledge that it flies in the face of traditional tort the-
54. Professor Mechem regards these "exceptions" more as the "disappearing im-
munity of the employer of an independent contractor." P. MECHEM, supra note 13,
§§ 480-498.
55. Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 295, 5 A.2d 10, 12 (1939).
56. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me.
272, 8 A.2d 201 (1939).
57. Id See also Sadler v. Great Western Ry. [1896] A.C. 450.
58. This joint and several liability continues in vitality even when states have
adopted comparative negligence. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal.
3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Christians v. Homestake Enterprises,
Ltd., 97 Wis. 2d 638, 648, 294 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Ct. .App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 101 Wis. 2d 25, 303 N.W.2d 608 (1981) (citing Chart v. General Motors
Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977)).
59. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
60. See, e.g., Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967). But see Panasuk v.
Seaton, 277 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968).
61. See P. MECHEM, supra note 13, §§ 404-406 and cases cited therein.
62. Brennan v. Huber, 112 Pa. Super. 299, 171 A. 122 (1934). The same certainly
holds true for genuine joint tortfeasors. See Verhoeks v. Gillivan, 244 Mich. 367, 221
N.W. 287 (1928).
1983]
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ory.6 3 They readily recognize they cannot justify awarding a
judgment jointly against master and servant on the basis that
the two are joint tortfeasors. 64 However, they reach this re-
sult based on justice and good conscience.65
Vermont, which first barred joint recovery and later re-
versed itself, provides an ideal opportunity to review the two
positions. In Raymond v. Capobianco 6 6 the plaintiff had ear-
lier recovered a judgment against the driver of a truck which
had injured him and then, having failed to obtain satisfac-
tion from the driver, sought a second judgment against the
owner. The Vermont Supreme Court sustained the judg-
ment of the trial court in favor of the owner.67 Recognizing
that the issue of election remained unsettled, with some ju-
risdictions holding a plaintiff could not sue both principal
and agent and others holding that he could, the court held:
We are unable to perceive how any of the principles
under which joint tort-feasors are held to be jointly and
severally liable to an injured party are applicable to a
master and servant - . . .
The master is not a wrongdoer, but the law gives to the
injured party the right to elect to treat the master and ser-
63. But see Moss v. Jones, 93 N.J. Super. 179, 225 A.2d 369 (1966) (court seems to
find some justification for the rule).
64. "It is to be observed at the outset that in reality the master is not a tort-feasor
at all. He is not a wrongdoer." McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N.H. 169, _ 123 A. 229,
230 (1923). Justice Peaslee's opinion merits note for the unique way it reaches this
conclusion. At the time, New Hampshire prohibited joint tortfeasors from seeking
contribution or indemnity. However, masters had the right to either one from their
tortfeasor servants. Accordingly, reasoned Justice Peaslee, one essential attribute of a
joint tortfeasor was the inability to seek contribution or indemnity, and since a master
did not possess this attribute, he could not possibly be a joint tortfeasor.
65. Courts may speak of an "identity" of the principal and agent. McNamara v.
Chapman, 81 N.H. 169, _.., 123 A. 229,231 (1923); Cravens v. Laurence, 181 S.C. 165,
- 186 S.E. 269, 271-72 (1936). This is the fiction which Professor Wigmore criticized
(see supra text accompanying note 18) and which marks the general sense of equity
acknowledged by Judge Taft in Warax v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 72 F. 637, 643
(1896). Some states still require an election even in the case of master and servant.
See McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N.H. 169, 123 A. 229 (1923); Shaver v. Shircks Mo-
tor Express, 163 Ohio St. 484, 127 N.E.2d 355 (1955).
66. 107 Vt. 295, 178 A. 896 (1935).
67. The first plea raised a theory of identity of parties--that the plaintiff could
not sue the owner as he had a valid judgment from the prior suit against the driver,
who was identical to the owner. (Cf. supra note 65). The second urged estoppel based
on the prior judgment. The third plea proved the critical one--that in attaining a
judgment against the driver the plaintiff made a binding election barring him from
later suing the owner/principal. Raymond, 107 Vt. at 296-97, 178 A. at 896-97.
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vant as one and recover from the master, or to disregard
their relation and recover from the servant.68
The case brought heated criticism from two leading law
journals. Analogizing to the doctrine of election in contracts
cases, the Columbia Law Review69 pointed out that, as com-
mentators universally condemned its application there, it has
even less applicability in tort cases where the same act gives
rise to both causes of action.70  The Yale Law Journal7'
pointed out that not only was the theory of the case called
into question7 2 but from a practical viewpoint joinder would
avoid a needless duplicity of actions.73 Since essentially the
same issues come to play in the trial of the master as well as
in that of the servant, consolidation of the two would save
valuable court time. Above all, the author of the article rea-
soned, to force an election "in many instances may well de-
feat the demands of justice.' 74
Twenty-one years after Raymond, Vermont reconsidered
its stance in Daniels v. Parker.75 Pointing to the criticism of
Raymond,76 the court analyzed its earlier position, at first
finding the precedents it had used to be of little weight.77
Even here, the court's rejection of its earlier decision rested
not so much on legal theory as on legal pragmatism. "When
one asks the broad, ultimate question, what does the old rule
contribute to the administration of justice which justifies its
retention, no good reason is apparent. ' 78 This same criti-
cism, based on equity and common justice, formed a signifi-
cant basis of the comment in the Columbia Law Review. 7 9
68. Raymond, 107 Vt. at 303, 178 A. at 899.
69. 36 COLUM. L. REv. 324 (1936).
70. Id at 325-26.
71. Note, Unsatisfied Judgments Against Servants as Bars to Subsequent Actions
Against Non-Negligent Masters, 45 YALE L.J. 920 (1936).
72. I.d at 921-24.
73. Id at 926.
74. Id
75. 119 Vt. 348, 126 A.2d 85 (1956).
76. Id at 351, 126 A.2d at 87.
77. In particular, the court assailed Parsons v. Winchell, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 592
(1850), as later overruled by statute and, in any event, "[e]ven at the time it was de-
cided... not to have been supportable by reason or authority." Daniels, 119 Vt. at
352, 126 A.2d at 87.
78. Daniels, 119 Vt. at 353, 126 A.2d at 88.
79. See supra note 10.
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The reliance on common sense rather than on established
legal theory stems in large part from an effort to make suits
based on vicarious liability fit into the pigeonholes dictated
by the law of torts. As indicated earlier,8 ° these pigeonholes
are round and the pegs, or procedure, are square, being dic-
tated by the law of agency. The more pragmatic agency doc-
trine readily acknowledges the necessity of suing both
master and servant in one action and of giving the plaintiff
the opportunity to satisfy a judgment against either.8' Vica-
rious liability, created by the courts to give plaintiffs access
to alternative sources of recompense without regard to indi-
vidual "fault," readily permits a judgment against both a
master and a servant and a satisfaction from either.82 The
master has his remedy in a suit against the servant for breach
of fiduciary duty just as a joint tortfeasor has his remedy in
contribution. 3
V. ELECTION BETWEEN AGENT AND
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
A. The Theory
When considering actions in contract against agents and
their undisclosed principals, however, courts have reached a
result opposite to that in tort actions. Most courts prefer to
require the plaintiff to elect which of the two defendants will
shoulder the burden of paying the judgment, rather than
permitting joint and several liability.84 While courts requir-
ing election do so either after verdict but before judgment,85
only upon motion by one of the defendants,86 or at any time
a plaintiff has made a knowing decision to proceed against
one of the parties to the exclusion of the other,8 7 only a mi-
80.' See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
81. Cf. Melichar v. Frank, 78 S.D. 58, _, 98 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1959).
82. Moss v. Jones, 93 N.J. Super. 179, 225 A.2d 369 (1966).
83. See supra notes 53-54.
84. Hohauser v. Schor, 101 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Joseph
Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick, 361 Pa. 328, 334, 64 A.2d 773, 776 (1949); P.
MECHEM, supra note 13, § 158.
85. See, e.g., Capitol Hardware Mfg. v. Naponiello, 345 M1. App. 272, 102 N.E.2d
685 (1951).
86. See, e.g., Conner v. Steel, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 1, 470 P.2d 71 (1970).
87. See, eg., Hatley Mfg. v. Smith, 154 Miss. 846, 123 So. 887 (1929).
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nority of courts refuse to require the plaintiff to make such a
choice.88
Courts frequently cite two early California opinions in
adopting one form or another of the election requirement:
Ewing v. Hayward89 and Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co. 90 In
those two cases the California court held liability between
agent and undisclosed principal to be alternative. 9' The only
two theories supporting joint and several liability - duality
of contract and joint obligation - both failed in the situa-
tion of the undisclosed principal. The plaintiff entered into
only one contractual relationship and, accordingly, "cannot
make two contracts out of the one contract by seeking to
hold each of those two persons [principal and agent] liable
severally as an independent obligor. ' ' 92 Similarly, only one
person signed the contract, either in his own name or in a
representative capacity. Since the principal was undisclosed,
the plaintiff never knew of the representative capacity of the
signatory "and though he may elect to hold either one of the
two liable as the obligor under the contract, he may not hold
[both principal and agent] jointly liable, for to do so would
be to give him two obligors where he contracted with, and
for the liability of, but one."93 Other courts felt an election
stemmed from the nature of the cause of action rather than
the contract: "The cause of action was single and could not
be the basis of two distinct judgments. 94 These two theories
may perhaps be in accord if we view the suit against both
parties as a suit for joint liability, while the actual proof sim-
ply demonstrates several liability on a single contract.95
Some courts held that the procedural barriers raised by a
joint suit mandated election. They rejected joint suits
88. See, e.g., Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
89. 50 Cal. App. 708, - 195 P. 970, 974 (1920) (Finlayson, P.J., concurring).
90. 107 Cal. App. 97, 290 P. 127 (1930).
91. Ewing v. Hayward, 50 Cal. App. at -, 195 P. at 974. See also Domfield v.
Thompson, 177 Wis. 4, 7, 187 N.W. 683, 684 (1922).
92. Ewing v. Hayward, 50 Cal. App. at -, 195 P. at 974.
93. Id
94. Coles v. McKenna, 80 N.J.L. 48, _, 76 A. 344, 345-46 (1910) (citing Kendall
v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504 (H.L. 1879)). See also § 435 explanatory note, supra
note 4, at 35 ("The two causes of action are not inconsistent, since the agent is liable
because he made the contract, while the principal is liable because he caused it to be
made.").
95. This rationale was one basis of Goodale v. Page, 92 S.C. 413, 75 S.E. 700
(1912).
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against defendants because neither defendant could raise an
individual counterclaim against the plaintiff.96 Alternatively,
the election to hold one party liable automatically dis-
charged the liability of the other, providing him with an ab-
solute defense.97 However they phrased their rationale,
these cases looked to earlier English cases for their justifica-
tion, most notably to Kendall v. Hamilton. 98 In that case the
justices felt that a manifest injustice would ensue if the
plaintiff had two causes of action "when it was never the
intention of any of the parties that he should do so." 99 How-
ever, as Professor Mechem noted, while Kendall reached its
result based on the theory of merger of a cause of action into
a prior judgment,"o the American cases rejected the merger
thesis in all other regards.' 0 ' Thus, it would seem that the
theoretical underpinnings of those cases requiring election
stand in unstable soil.
Commentators have questioned the application of the
doctrine of election (or merger) to the undisclosed principal
setting from its very inception. Kendall itself came about de-
spite a strong dissent from Lord Penzance:
What justice, then, is there in saying that when three per-
sons are, all and each, individually liable to pay a debt, an
action and judgment (still unsatisfied) against two of them
should extinguish the liability of the third?
[This Court] strangely departs from its proper office
when, in place of facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct,
96. Id at _, 75 S.E. at 701.
97. Pennsylvania Casualty v. Washington Portland Cement, 63 Wash. 689,
116 P. 284, 285-86 (1911).
98. 4 App. Cas. 504 (H.L. 1879).
99. Id at 514 (Lord Cairns). Lord Hatherley agreed, feeling those entering a
contract have "a right to have the whole matter settled at once." Id at 522. Lord
Selborne favored a holding based on resjudicala Id at 540. The most pragmatic
opinion, that of Lord Blackburn, stated that:
"The Plaintiffs [who had earlier obtained judgment against an insolvent part-
ner/agent] got a right by operation of law, without any merits of their own, by
what, as far as regards them, was pure good luck .... If the Plaintiffs were
willing to take advantage of their good luck against the Defendant, it seems no
hardship that he should take advantage of their bad luck against them."
Id at 544.
100. P. MECHEM, supra note 13, §§ 156-157.
101. Id § 158.
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and even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus made to gov-
ern where it ought to subserve.
102
In the United States the argument came to a head with
the adoption of the Restatement of Agency. 0 3 Prior to the
deliberations which led to the promulgation of the Restate-
ment, at least one commentator had considered the topic,
°4
feeling it at best constituted a rule of procedure rather than a
true election 0 5 - an exhaustion of a cause of action rather
than a conscious determination to forego a right to sue. ° 6
Later discussion would take a far more critical position.
The American Law Institute adopted the view of the ma-
jority of American cases, holding that a plaintiff who recov-
ered a judgment against a principal or his agent could no
longer proceed against the other. 0 7 In so doing, however, it
went against the belief of its drafters that the better rule fa-
vored doing away with the election doctrine in this in-
stance. 0 8  Believing that American decisions which had
earlier abandoned the English doctrine of merger now re-
verted to it in this one isolated instance, 0 9 Warren Seavey
102. Kendall, 4 App. Cas. at 524-25 (Lord Penzance).
103. As ultimately promulgated, RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 210(1) (1933) read:
"An undisclosed principal is discharged from liability upon a contract if, with knowl-
edge of the identity of the principal, the other party recovers judgment against the
agent who made the contract." This has been preserved intact in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 210(1) (1957). Corresponding sections dealing with release
of liability of an agent by election to take judgment against the undisclosed principal
are RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 337 (1933) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 337 (1957).
104. Clayton, Election Between the Liability of an 4gent and of His Undisclosed
Principal, 3 TEx. L. Rnv. 384 (1925). But see Holloway, Undisclosed Princzal-Elec-
tion, 98 CENT. L.J. 280 (1925).
105. See Clayton, supra note 104, at 408-09.
106. I say electing advisedly; for election being a mental condition, [the third
party] forms a mental determination to take judgment against the one and not
the other, and having taken such judgment, he is forever barred from after-
wards pursuing the other, not because he elected not to pursue him, but be-
cause, in pursuance of that election, he took a judgment which exhausted his
cause of action, and it no longer exists.
Id at 410-11 (emphasis in original).
107. See supra note 103.
108. 7 A.L.I. PROC. 256 (1929) (Comments of W. Seavey); § 435 explanatory
note, supra note 4.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 104-105; § 435 explanatory note, supra
note 4.
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criticized the majority rule, saying: "We do not think that is
a sound theory, sound common sense or good justice."110
Nonetheless, the Institute, feeling that it did not wish to have
the Restatement depart from established law, determined to
adopt the rule of the majority of the cases and "not be too
bold." ' l
Professor Seavey's comments found another voice in an
extensive article by Maurice Merrill, compiling all cases in
the area and severely criticizing the action of the Institute in
adopting the election rule.1 2 Professor Merrill at first ques-
tioned the determination of the Institute that the majority of
courts did in fact adhere to election." 3 More to the point, he
dissected and destroyed with great gusto each of the argu-
ments propounded in support of the rule. Pursuit of both
agent and principal did not lead to inconsistencies for, as
with an action in tort,1 4 the basis for suit differed for each." 5
The remaining arguments held little weight when balanced
against the basic purpose of liability of the undisclosed prin-
cipal, that is, "assurance to the third person of the economic
110. 7 A.L.I. PROC. 256, 257 (1929).
111. Id The reporter's notes accompanying the readoption of § 2 10 in the second
Restatement indicate a continued reluctance to break with precedent despite a feeling
that the rule was unfair. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 210 reporter's note
(1957). Considering the recent decision by the Institute to depart from precedent, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), such past timidity deserves reex-
amination, if not criticism. Indeed, Professor Seavey himself is reported to have
strongly opposed the decision to have the Restatements reflect only existing law, even
where that law represents an unjust rule. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRO-
CESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 761 (tent. ed.
1958). See generally id at 757-71.
112. Merrill, Election Between Agent and Undisclosed Princpal: Shall We Follow
the Restatement?, 12 NEB. L. BULL. 100 (1933).
113. "Five to four decisions may be eminently proper in the Supreme Court of
the United States with a membership of nine but it hardly seems permissible to regard
a five to four count as sufficient to bind forty-eight American jurisdictions to a partic-
ular rule .. " Id at 117. See also Johnson & Higgins v. Charles F. Garrigues Co.,
30 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., dissenting). However, given those states
which (as Professor Merrill noted) had dicta supporting the rule, and those adopting
the view of the first Restatement, by the time of the adoption of the second Restate-
ment the rule favoring election clearly held sway in the majority of American juris-
dictions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 210 reporter's note (1957).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
115. One sues the agent based on the contract and the principal based on opera-
tion of law. Merrill, supra note 112, at 118-22.
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advantage for which he bargained."' 1 6 Thus, the argument
that since the law gives the plaintiff a windfall, it can later
remove it by requiring an election'" 7 totally failed to con-
sider the economic rights of the injured third party."8 Using
the doctrine of election to serve the same purpose as res judi-
cata"19 far overstepped what courts needed to do in order to
cure the evil. 20 Finally, perhaps the strongest argument put
forth in Kendall, that without election the plaintiff would
have two judgments coexisting at the same time,' 2' simply
placed the rights of the defendant before those of the plain-
tiff. The balance, given the purpose for liability of the undis-
closed principal, should tilt the scales in favor of the plaintiff
instead. 22
In the years between the Restatements, judges123 and
commentators' 24 continued to voice their disapproval of the
rule. Finally, in a whimsical piece, 25 Professor Merrill re-
viewed the progress of the rule since the first Restatement,
discerning a trend away from the rule of election, and calling
on the Restatement "[t]o abandon election, that height of
nonsensity."'126 The trend, however, would not materialize
despite some courts moving away from the election rule and
one state - New York - abrogating the rule by statute.127
116. Id at 126. The term "advantage" refers to the economic expectations cre-
ated by the contractual right held by the third party. It does not allude to the liability
of the agent or any nonexistent expectation against the undisclosed principal.
117. See supra note 99 (Lord Blackburn).
118. Merrill, supra note 112, at 126.
119. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hutchinson, 93 Miss. 643, 48 So. 178 (1909).
120. It "is like using a piledriver to crack a papershell pecan, and has about as
undesirable consequences." Merrill, supra note 112, at 128.
121. Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504, 515 (H.L. 1879) (Lord Cairns).
122. Merrill, supra note 112, at 129. As noted earlier, courts have little trouble
arriving at this result in cases brought in tort. See supra text accompanying notes 61-
65.
123. "This harsh doctrine, resting at most on a rather barren logic, appears to be
giving way to the more equitable view that, in the absence of some estoppel, there
is no election until a judgment is actually satisfied ..... Oregon S.S. Corp. v.
D/S A/S Hassel, 137 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1943).
124. Comment, Undisclosed Princpal's Rights and Liabilities: A Test of Election
of Remedies, 39 CALIF. L. Rnv. 409 (1951). See generally Note, Election of Remedies:
A Delusion?, 38 COLUM. L. Rnv. 292 (1938).
125. Merrill, supra note 1. This article, while copiously footnoted, is entirely in
verse and the reader can actually sing it to the tune of "The Old Oaken Bucket."
126. Id at 617.
127. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-B (1939) (expressly enacted to overturn Georgi v.
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The refusal of the drafters of the second Restatement to heed
Professor Merrill's call for reform 128 led to a continuation of
the jumble of law in the area.
B. What Constitutes Election-Three Views
No matter what position a court takes regarding the
event which constitutes election, all courts agree that the
plaintiff must at least know he has an option to sue either the
agent or the principal before they will require him to make
an election. 129 Thus, where a third party neither knew nor
had reason to know of the existence of a principal at the time
he took a judgment against an agent, he could later prose-
cute an action against the principal. The court held he had
not made an election. 130  "Election to sue [the agent] which
defendant says bars subsequent suits against it involved a
choice, and choice presupposes knowledge of the alterna-
tives and freedom and ability to choose between them. A
plaintiff cannot choose between principal and agent if he
does not know who is the principal."' 3' Indeed, the defend-
ant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff made a
knowing election. 132 One court has even held that in a suit
against both principal and agent, a default judgment which
ordered the case calendered for trial against one party did
not constitute a knowing election. 33 Thus, the single hall-
mark of an election to which all courts refer is that the plain-
Texas Co., 225 N.Y. 410, 122 N.E. 238 (1919)). See N.Y. LAW REv. COMM. REPORT
213-814 (1939). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 111, at 603-06.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 210, 337 (1957).
129. P. MECHEM, supra note 13, § 158. See also Clayton, supra note 104, at 400-
01; RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 210(2) (1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 210(2) (1957).
130. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal v. Williams, 70 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1934). See also
Hugener v. Greider's Wooden Shoe, 108 111. App. 2d 98, 246 N.E.2d 323 (1969);
Steele-Smith Grocery v. Potthast, 109 Iowa 413, 80 N.W. 517 (1899); Gavin v. Dur-
den Coleman Lumber, 229 Mass. 576, 118 N.E. 897 (1918); Eckstein v. Caldwell, 61
R.I. 142, 200 A. 434 (1938).
131. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal v. Williams, 70 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1934). An
interesting point is that although this court would have applied the doctrine of elec-
tion had there been a knowing choice, the case it cites as authority for this exception
to the doctrine is Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298 (1875), which expressly rejects the
doctrine in toto.
132. Beacham v. Coe-Mortimer Co., 30 Ga. App. 456, 118 S.E. 441 (1923); Auto-
car Sales & Serv. v. Holscher, 11 S.W.2d 1072 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928).
133. North Carolina Lumber v. Spear Motor, 192 N.C. 377, 135 S.E. 115 (1926).
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tiff have done so knowingly. However, courts have followed
three distinct lines of reasoning in determining when the
plaintiff must make, or will be held to have made, an
election.
Of those states adhering to the election doctrine, a minor-
ity follow its most onerous manifestation, requiring the
plaintiff to elect at the earliest possible moment. Typically,
these courts prohibit a plaintiff from pursuing an action
against the agent and the principal jointly.134 In one state,
this result is due to a statute,13 5 while in the others, common
law itself has developed the rule. 36 Even in these states,
however, courts have avoided finding an election in the ab-
sence of a clear indication. Thus, while taking an actual
judgment against the agent will preclude a later suit against
the principal,137 where a broker charged the account of a
principal with a transaction but never collected the debt he
could later proceed against the agent,1 38 and where the plain-
tiff entered into a later contract with the principal he could
still sue the agent so long as the later contract remained
executory. 1
39
Despite these ameliorative efforts, requiring an early
election runs contrary to the interests ofjustice. North Caro-
lina based its determination to prohibit joint suits on the
conclusion that to do otherwise would be "placing an unnec-
essary burden upon trial and possibly leading to confu-
134. Cf. Merrill, supra note 112, at 104-05.
135. GA. CODE A'N. § 4-305 (1981), as interpreted by Dinkier Mgmt. Corp. v.
Stein, 115 Ga. App. 586, 155 S.E.2d 442 (1967). However, although Dinkler uses the
Code as authority for prohibiting joint suits, the Code itself is totally silent on the
matter. Georgia decisions predating the Code (enacted in 1933) do, however, bar
joint actions. E.g., Willingham, Wright & Covington v. Glover, 28 Ga. App. 394,396,
111 S.E. 206, 208 (1922).
136. Federal: The Jungshoved, 290 F. 733 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. deniedsub nom
Dampskibs Selsk Dannebrog v. J. Aron & Co., 263 U.S. 707 (1923). Massachusetts:
Williams v. Investors Syndicate, 327 Mass. 124, 97 N.E.2d 395 (1951). Missouri:
Banjo v. Wacker, 251 S.W. 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); but see Burckhardt v. General
Am. Life Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (dictum suggesting a joint suit
may progress with an election required at some point prior to judgment). North Car-
olina: Walston v. R.B. Whitley & Co., 226 N.C. 537, 39 S.E.2d 375 (1946). Ohio:
Campbell v. Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (dictum) (applying Ohio
law but without citing any Ohio cases).
137. Bovard v. Owen, 30 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
138. Wieselman v. Anderson, 43 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
139. Negbaur v. Fogel Const. Co., 58 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
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sion.' 40 However, Professor Merrill criticizes this rationale:
"The utter unsoundness of the policy argument is demon-
strated by the numerous decisions which allow actions
brought against both principal and agent to proceed through
trial .... "141 Further, as this article later discusses, 142 an
early election provides the plaintiff with no opportunity,
under prevailing law or under an expanded form of discov-
ery, to ascertain which of the potential defendants has
greater assets, and which he, accordingly, should elect.
The vast majority of courts follow the Restatement view
and permit a plaintiff to pursue a cause of action against
both principal and agent, requiring, however, that at some
point prior to judgment the plaintiff elect against whom he
will take judgment. 43 Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co. 144 justi-
fied this approach as follows:
An election before the rendition of judgment might not ac-
cord with the court's view of the relationship as disclosed
by the evidence. A premature choice might result in an
erroneous selection and a total loss of a valid claim ....
The law will not require a litigant to gamble on his
remedy. 145
Even in these jurisdictions, however, the very fact of an elec-
tion before a litigant has the opportunity to ascertain the rel-
ative net worth of the defendants means that, contrary to
Klinger's express language, the law does "require a litigant
to gamble on his remedy." In any event, a plaintiff may wait
through the trial stage before having to exercise the
election.146
140. Walston v. R.B. Whitley & Co., 226 N.C. 537, _ 39 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1946).
141. Merrill, supra note 1, at n.17.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 243-45.
143. See supra note 103.
144. 107 Cal. App. 97, 290 P. 127 (1930).
145. 107 Cal. App. at - 290 P. at 129.
146. Florida: Bertram Yacht Sales v. West, 209 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Hohauser v. Schor, 101 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Ilinois: Johnson
v. Fischer, 108 IMI. App. 2d 433, 247 N.E.2d 805 (1969); Capitol Hardware Mfg. v.
Naponiello, 345 MII. App. 272, 102 N.E.2d 685 (1951). Iowa: Steele-Smith Grocery
Co. v. Potthast, 109 Iowa 413, 80 N.W. 517 (1899). Kansas: Homer v. McCormick, 8
Kan. App. 333, 56 P. 1124 (1899). Louisiana: LaBella Insulation, Inc. v. Connolly,
182 So. 2d 117 (La. Ct. App. 1966). Michigan: Old Ben Coal Co. v. Universal Coal
Co., 248 Mich. 486, 227 N.W. 794 (1929). Minnesota: Stevens v. Wisconsin Farm
Land Co., 124 Minn. 421, 145 N.W. 173 (1914). Mississippi: Hatley Mfg. Co. v.
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A plaintiff need not take a case through to a final judg-
ment before he will have made an election. Where a defend-
ant cross-claimed against a plaintiff, asserting failure of the
plaintiff to deliver a tractor sold by his agent, a later settle-
ment of the claim with the agent would bar prosecution of
the cross-claim-' 47  Thus, any procedural step which
amounts to a final determination that either principal or
agent will incur liability acts as an election which will bar
suit against the other - an election which courts hold
irrevocable. 148
Due perhaps to the finality imposed by the rule of irrevo-
cability, courts have declined to find an election to hold a
party liable based only on decisions made in the course of
business. In one instance, a party assigned a claim against
another "as well as any undisclosed principal or principals
whom they represent."'149  The court held that this assign-
ment, even if it amounted to an act seeking to charge the
agent with liability, did not constitute such a decisive act as
to justify its being an election. 50 Similarly, continuing to
deal with the agent even after disclosure of the existence of a
principal, will not constitute an election.' 5' Finally, an un-
disclosed principal does not escape potential liability simply
because a third party claims to look only to the agent for
payment even though knowing of the principal's existence. 52
Smith, 154 Miss. 846, 123 So. 887 (1929). New Jersey: Raymond-Commerce Corp. v.
Warner, 16 N.J. Misc. 548, 2 A.2d 878 (1938) (dictum); Coles v. McKenna, 80 N.J.L.
48, 76 A. 344 (1910). Rhode Island: Eckstein v. Caldwell, 61 R.I. 142, 200 A. 434
(1938) (dictum). South Carolina: Goodale v. Page, 92 S.C. 413, 75 S.E. 700 (1912).
Tennessee: Hill v. Hill, 34 Tenn. App. 617, 241 S.W.2d 865 (1951). Texas: Owen v.
King, 84 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S.W.2d 695
(Tex. 1938); Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Roquemore, 88 S.W. 449 (rex. Civ. App.
1905). Virginia: Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S.E. 137 (1924) (dictum indicates
the court favors this variation). Washington: Pennsylvania Casualty v. Washington
Portland Cement, 63 Wash. 689, 116 P. 284 (1911). West Virginia: Pittsburgh Termi-
nal Coal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1934) (weak dictum applying West
Virginia law). Wisconsin: Dornfield v. Thompson, 177 Wis. 4, 187 N.W. 683 (1922).
147. Klassie v. Holt, 233 Iowa 826, 10 N.W.2d 540 (1943). See also Love v. St.
Joseph Stock Yards, 51 Utah 305, 169 P. 951 (1917).
148. See, e.g., Bell v. Borders, 205 Ky. 181, 265 S.W. 514 (Ct. App. 1924).
149. Berry v. Chase, 179 F. 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1910).
150. Id at 429.
151. Sanger v. Warren, 40 S.W. 840, 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), rev'd on other
grounds, 91 Tex. 472, 44 S.W. 477 (1898).
152. Union Trust Co. v. Rodeman, 220 Wis. 453, 472, 264 N.W. 508, 515 (1936).
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In these cases we continue to see two patterns: the need of
courts to adopt rules which interfere as little as possible with
the free flow of commerce, 153 and a continuing reluctance of
courts to apply the doctrine of election unless absolutely
mandated by the facts.154
A third view, adopted by a handful of courts, would still
require an election prior to judgment, but only upon motion
of one of the defendants.1 55 Failure to move constitutes a
waiver of the right to demand an election, and in the absence
of such a motion the plaintiff may have judgment against
either or both defendants. 156 This rule has particular appeal
in those cases where the purported principal disputes the
agency. The motion for election will thus put the issue
clearly before the court at the earliest possible moment, and
the court can then take it under advisement until the plaintiff
has established the agency relationship. 57
In these states as well, an affirmative act of election con-
nected with the litigation must take place before the court
will discharge either principal or agent from liability. Sim-
ply obtaining the financial statement of an agent will not
constitute such an election. 58  Indeed, one bizarre decision
held that even though the third party elected to pursue the
principal, he could later seek judgment against the agent as
well. 159 Although the case deals with a partially disclosed
principal, the rationale for holding the agent liable generally
is identical to that of holding the agent liable for an undis-
153. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
154. See P. MECHEM, supra note 13, § 159.
155. California: Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co., 107 Cal. App. 97, 290 P. 127
(1930). Colorado: Conner v. Steel, Inc., 470 P.2d 71 (Colo. App. 1970). Nevada:
Peccole v. Fresno Air Serv., 86 Nev. 377,469 P.2d 397 (1970); Nesbitt v. Cherry Creek
Irrigation Co., 38 Nev. 150, 145 P. 929 (1915). New Hampshire: Hoyt v. Horst, 105
N.H. 380, 201 A.2d 118 (1964). Utah: Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d
772 (1958). "The need to resort to this variation strongly suggests the dissatisfaction
of courts with the basic election rule." Grinder v. Bryans Rd. Bldg. & Supply Co., 290
Md. 687, _, 432 A.2d 453, 464 (1981).
156. Luce v. Sutton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 428, 252 P.2d 352 (1953). See also Hoyt v.
Horst, 105 N.H. 380, 201 A.2d 118 (1964); Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324
P.2d 772 (1958).
157. McEwen v. Taylor, 106 Cal. App. 2d 25, 234 P.2d 754 (1951).
158. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
159. Peccole v. Fresno Air Serv., 86 Nev. 377, 469 P.2d 397 (1970).
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closed principal. 160  Not surprisingly, this case stands by it-
self. Where the defendants make their pro forma motion for
election, the plaintiff can simply elect to pursue the princi-
pal, using this precedent to support a later case against the
agent. Thus, this case effectively does away with the doc-
trine of election in any practical manner.
Whether one views election as a procedural or a substan-
tive matter, 61 the majority of states require election at some
point in the proceedings. While some forms of the doctrine
prove less onerous than others, they all require a plaintiff to
blindly guess which defendant has the greater ability to pay
a judgment. Thus, the entire concept of a "knowing" elec-
tion falls frustrated by the way.
C. States Rejecting Election
A small but slowly increasing number of states totally re-
ject the concept of election and permit plaintiffs to secure a
judgment against both the undisclosed principal and the
agent, although obtaining only a single satisfaction. 62  One
160. "Fresno Air elected to proceed against Peccole and Perlman. This election
did not destroy the right to recover since an agent is not absolved from liability on a
contract which he has made for a partially disclosed principal." Peccole v. Fresno Air
Serv., 86 Nev. 377, _, 469 P.2d 397, 399 (1970). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 321 (1957) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 322 (1957).
Thus, the case will serve as precedent where an undisclosed principal is involved. But
see Sargent & Rochvarg, A Reexamination of the Agency Doctrine of Election, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 411 (1982) (advocates different rules of election for undisclosed and
partially disclosed principals).
161. Requiring election only on motion may seem to reduce the issue to one of
procedure. This article takes no position on whether federal courts sitting in these
states need follow state practice or can apply their own rule as one of procedure,
pursuant to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
162. Arkansas: Williamson v. O'Dwyer & Ahern Co., 127 Ark. 530, 192 S.W.
899 (1917). Kansas: State Bank of Kingman v. Braly's Estate, 139 Kan. 788, 33 P.2d
141 (1934) (claim against principal in bankruptcy does not preclude concurrent claim
against agent); but see Amortibanc Inv. Co. v. Rampart Associated Mgmt., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 227, 627 P.2d 389 (1981). Kentucky: Hoffman v. Anderson, 112 Ky. 893, 67
S.W. 49 (1902) (claim against agent in bankruptcy does not preclude claim against
principal); but see Bell v. Borders, 205 Ky. 181, 265 S.W. 514 (Ct. App. 1924). Mary-
land: Grinder v. Bryans Rd. Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687, 432 A.2d 453 (1981).
Nebraska: Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952); Lincoln Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Bexten, 125 Neb. 310, 250 N.W. 84 (1933). Pennsylvania: Joseph
Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick, 361 Pa. 328, 64 A.2d 773 (1949); Beymer v.
Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298 (1875). New York reached this result through legislation. N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. ACT § 112-B (1939).
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early case eschewed doctrinal considerations, couching its
decision in procedural terms. In Arkansas the supreme court
affirmed a judgment against a principal and an agent
jointly.1 63
[A]s both the undisclosed principal and the agent are liable
for a debt incurred by the agent within the scope of his
authority, it is unimportant to inquire whether or not there
is any such joint liability as authorizes a suit against them
jointly, for the reason that the two actions, if brought sepa-
rately, could properly be consolidated .... 14
More typically, however, courts addressed the substance
of the problem. The seminal case, Beymer v. Bonsall,165
ironically came as a per curiam decision from the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. The court adopted a sweeping
view of contractual liability, holding that once one incurs li-
ability under a contract he can absolve it only through an
actual satisfaction, not through the intermediate step of a
judgment. 166 Accordingly, as both the principal and agent
have liability on the contract made by the agent, neither can
avoid liability until the creditor has satisfied his claim.
From this, it naturally follows that a creditor may obtain a
judgment against either. 167 However, as the liability thus be-
comes joint and several, 168 a release or other satisfaction
gained from either the principal or agent will discharge the
other to the extent of the payment made. 16 9
After a welter of early cases in lower courts yielding con-
flicting precedent,1 70 the New York Court of Appeals de-
163. Williamson v. O'Dwyer & Ahern Co., 127 Ark. 530, 192 S.W. 899 (1917).
The court also broke with tradition in that case by holding a husband could serve as
his wife's agent.
164. Id at - 192 S.W. at 899.
165. 79 Pa. 298 (1875).
166. But see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.2 (1982): "The principal legal
remedy to enforce a promise is a judgment awarding a sum of money." See also D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.3 (1973): "The law of remedies is
only indirectly concerned with devices used to enforce remedies once they have been
denied." The Pennsylvania view, although undeniably practical, does not follow the
purer practice of separating a judgment from remedies used to collect it.
167. 79 Pa. at 300.
168. Joseph Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Menick, 361 Pa. 328, _ 64 A.2d
773, 777 (1949).
169. Id
170. "The doctrine of election in its general application, is unsuitable and harsh,
and it should not be applied to an action brought upon a contract made by an agent
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cided to adopt the doctrine of election in Georgi v. Texas
Co. 171 In succeeding years the negative comments directed
toward Georgi led to the passage of legislation specifically
aimed at avoiding its result, 172 and, thus, New York by stat-
ute rejected the doctrine of election. 173
Maryland, the most recent addition to the list of states
rejecting the doctrine of election, did so in the most thorough
manner. In Grinder v. Bryans Road Building & Supply Co. 17 4
the court narrowly examined many reasons other courts
gave for the doctrine and, using its own logic and liberally
borrowing from Professor Seavey, 175 rejected them all. Lev-
elling pointed criticism at the injustice of the doctrine, it then
expressly overruled prior Maryland decisions which had
adopted it.176  "If judgment in the second action is denied
solely because the law considers an election to have taken
place, a just claim has . . . been thwarted. . . . It could
leave the creditor with but one possibly uncollectible judg-
ment .... "177
If, as the minority of courts and virtually all commenta-
tors believe, the election doctrine presents such poor reason-
ing, why does it retain its vitality? One response certainly
must look to the Restatements, which by their timidity con-
tinue to effectively codify established, albeit ill-conceived,
law. Yet the real reason seems to lie deeper, entrenched in
the very foundations of agency law itself. The reasoning
supporting the imposition of both vicarious liability and the
without disclosing his principal, until the debt has been satisfied by one or the other."
Tew v. Wolfsohn, 77 A.D. 454, 458, 79 N.Y.S. 286, 288-89 (1902), a f'd on other
grounds, 174 N.Y. 272, 66 N.E. 934 (1903). Contra Cherrington v. Burchell, 147 A.D.
16, 131 N.Y.S. 631 (1911).
171. 225 N.Y. 410, 122 N.E. 238 (1919).
172. See supra note 127.
173. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 112-B (1939) (current version at N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 3002 (McKinney 1974)). See also N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 3002 practice com-
mentaries § C3002.21 (McKinney 1974). Contemporary cases now permit a plaintiff
to recover judgment against both principal and agent as a matter of course. See, e.g.,
Empire Livestock Mktg. Coop. v. Carney, 279 A.D. 951, 110 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1952).
174. 290 Md. 687, 432 A.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1981).
175. Section 435 explanatory note, supra note 4.
176. Garfinkel v. Schwartzman, 253 Md. 710, 254 A.2d 667 (1969); Hospelhom v.
Poe, 174 Md. 242, 198 A. 582 (1938); E.J. Codd Co. v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, 55 A. 623
(1903).
177. Grinder, 290 Md. at , 432 A.2d at 464.
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liability of the undisclosed principal has little to do with
traditional legal thought. Rather, these results came about
as the law attempted to adapt itself to the commercial reality
of surrounding society. Tort law, in rejecting the doctrine of
election in the case of the vicarious principal, continued to
cope with the problem by establishing a consistent line of
logic in cases dealing with the business world. In contrast,
contract law failed to adjust to the developing law of agency
and retained its traditional analysis in requiring an election.
This break with the more pragmatic approach in agency
cases led to a doctrine which, although perhaps facially con-
sistent with other cases arising in a noncommercial setting,
makes little sense and yields little equity where the purpose
of holding the principal liable is to provide two sources of
recompense for the injured third party.
Rationally and doctrinally, courts adopt the election ap-
proach in error. In the best of all possible worlds, they
would abandon their rule and reject the Restatement. Un-
fortunately, this has not occurred and there seems little hope
that it will occur with any rapidity in the future. Accord-
ingly, the courts need to adopt another method, within their
present structure, to minimize the harsh results which elec-
tion may produce.
VI. DISCOVERY OF NET WORTH
A. Before Judgment
Where a plaintiff must elect against which of two defend-
ants he will take a judgment, he should have some access to
information regarding the ability of each defendant to pay
the award. Otherwise, the plaintiff forced to choose does so
in the dark and frequently will select a defendant who to-
tally lacks resources which can satisfy a judgment. There
are two solutions which would avoid this problem: either
reject election totally and let the plaintiff recover a joint
judgment which in turn leads to a single satisfaction, or per-
mit the plaintiff to determine prior to making the election
which of the defendants has greater assets upon which he
can levy. With a majority of American courts rejecting the
former approach in suits against agents and their undis-
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closed principals, the implementation of the latter may pres-
ent a viable alternative.
Under both federal and state procedure, however, the
discovery of the net worth of a defendant in most cases falls
beyond the scope of discovery as traditionally viewed. 78 Al-
though generally quite broad, 179 discovery still has as its
outer boundaries those matters which pertain to the subject
matter of the action.18 0 In the typical case, the net worth of
either party seldom has any bearing on issues which arise at
trial.' 8' Accordingly, courts will prohibit discovery of net
worth on the motion of a party for a protective order.1 8 2
Courts so consistently reject any attempt by plaintiffs to dis-
cover the ability of defendants to pay a judgment1 8 3 that the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure found it
necessary to include a specific provision permitting limited
disclosure of the contents of insurance policies.1 8 4 The advi-
sory committee for the Federal Rules reasoned that a court
should properly except insurance policies from the general
rule of nondisclosure "because insurance is an asset created
178. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party "may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action." FED. R. Cwv. P. 26(b)(1).
179. Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961).
See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2007 (1970).
180. "The term 'subject matter' has sometimes been relied upon to distinguish
between substantive issues and those that deal with the mechanics of preparation and
litigation." 4 J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.56[l], at 26-
117 (2d ed. 1983).
181. "Ordinarily, Rule 26 will not permit the discovery of facts concerning a de-
fendant's financial status, or ability to satisfy a judgment, since such matters are not
relevant, and cannot lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Ranney-Brown
Distribs. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977). See also Bogosian
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (denying discovery of
plaintiff's net worth where defendant sought to determine plaintiff's ability to satisfy a
potential judgment for costs).
182. See, e.g., Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1968); Benoit v. International Harvester Co., 251 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1971).
183. Typical of early cases refusing discovery of the limits of liability insurance
policies is Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957). Florida has since passed a
statute specifically requiring disclosure of policy limits. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.045(l)(c) (West 1983).
184. FED. R. Crw. P. 26(b)(2). See Grise v. Crownover, 57 F.R.D. 210 (E.D.
Tenn. 1971); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 179, at § 2010.
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specifically to satisfy the claim." 185  In sum, where no sub-
stantive issue in a case deals with the net worth of a party,
another party will find the path to discovery of that net
worth blocked by an objection based on lack of relevance.
In certain instances, however, courts permit a party at
least limited latitude to discover the net worth of another.
Frequently a plaintiff seeking punitive damages may have
this discovery. By their very nature, punitive damages
should deter the defendant from continuing to pursue the
action which formed the basis of the complaint. 8 6 Accord-
ingly, they must form a warning to others in similar posi-
tions that courts will not tolerate such conduct 18 7 and so
must bear some direct relation to the ability of the defendant
to pay in order to serve their purpose. 8 8 Thus, since a jury
quite properly must consider the net worth of a defendant in
determining the amount of punitive damages to assess,18 9 a
plaintiff should have access to that information through dis-
covery at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. 90
Courts also routinely permit discovery of the net worth
of a party in divorce cases. 191 Whether at the initial hear-
ing192 or in later actions for modification due to changed cir-
185. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 advisory committee note (1970).
186. See, e.g., Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Il. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d
509 (1975); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980); Jones v.
Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908 (1979).
187. See, e.g., Trahan v. Cook, 288 Ala. 704, 710, 265 So. 2d 125, 130 (1972);
Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 522
(1957).
188. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975)
(net assets of $1.7 billion justified award of $1.1 million in punitive damages).
189. See Atlas Properties v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(example of how a court may use net worth in its computation of punitive damages).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977).
190. Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). See also
Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1375 (1969). "Thus, the net worth of the defendant is always a
material issue when punitive damages are sought, and the plaintiff is generally enti-
tled to discover such evidence and introduce it at trial." Note, Pretrial Discovery of
Net Worth in Punitive Damages Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141 (1981).
191. Some states expressly permit this discovery by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW. § 250 (McKinney 1981). More typically, however, courts imply the right
to discover. See, eg., Kocha v. Kocha, 349 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
192. See, e.g., Elkins v. Elkins, 228 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 59 A.D.2d 904, 399 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977).
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cumstances, 193 the net worth of a party bears directly on the
amount of alimony or child support he or she must pay.19 4 If
the opposing party does not obtain this information in ad-
vance of trial, he or she cannot adequately present a case on
the amount of the award.19 5 Accordingly, the information
has great relevance to issues at the hearing. On the other
hand, courts refuse to permit discovery when the amount of
an award of child support or alimony is not an issue, 196 thus
reinforcing the conclusion that discovery of net worth in
these cases will come only as a direct incidence of the rele-
vance of the information at the eventual hearing.
The third typical case in which pretrial discovery of net
worth comes into play is the class action, where a defendant
challenges the adequacy of representation a particular plain-
tiff will provide for the class as a whole. 197 The court must
certify the action as one properly conducted as a class ac-
tion and, in making this determination, must have avail-
able to it information regarding the ability of a plaintiff to
prosecute the case through to its ultimate conclusion.1 99 As a
result, courts permit discovery of the net worth of the plain-
tiff for the limited purpose of determining whether to certify
the class.2 0° However, courts have restricted the scope of
such discovery to general questioning in camera20 ' and have
closely scrutinized plaintiffs' requests for protective or-
193. Kocha v. Kocha, 349 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). At least one
court, however, has required a prima facie showing of changed circumstances as a
prerequisite to discovery in a modification proceeding. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139,
416 A.2d 45, 54 (1980).
194. Block v. Block, 281 Ala. 214, 201 So. 2d 51 (1967); O'Dell v. O'Dell, 57 Ala.
App. 185, 326 So. 2d 747 (1976).
195. "[W]ithout access to such reliable indicia of the supporting spouse's financial
ability, the movant may be unable to prove that modification is warranted." Lepis v.
Lepis, 83 NJ. 139, _ 416 A.2d 45, 54 (1980).
196. A father sued for a declaratory judgment to determine whether he remained
liable to pay weekly support for his son when he was at the same time paying college
expenses. The court denied the mother the opportunity to inquire into the father's net
worth. Heiman v. Heiman, 369 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
198. Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
199. Klein v. Henry S. Miller Residential Servs., 82 F.R.D. 6 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
200. Rode v. Emery Air Freight, 76 F.R.D. 229 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Stem v. Carter,
82 A.D.2d 321, 441 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1981).
201. Stem v. Carter, 82 A.D.2d at _, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
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ders.20 2 Of course, once the order certifying the class takes
effect, such discovery becomes irrelevant and the defendant
can no longer take advantage of it.
Other than in these three categories, courts permit pre-
judgment discovery only on a showing of genuine relevance.
Thus, where the president of a brokerage firm purportedly
misapplied the funds of his investors, the court permitted
discovery of his personal tax records and those of the firm.20 3
Along the same lines, discovery of the tax worth of defend-
ants in a case involving a conspiracy in violation of antitrust
statutes was allowed to proceed because the financial evi-
dence could have led to admissible evidence.2°  Another
court exhibited a willingness to permit discovery of net
worth in a case brought under the Truth in Lending Act.2 °5
In all of these cases the element of willful malfeasance may
have colored the court's judgment.
In Louisiana, where a defendant can plead inability to
pay a judgment in mitigation of damages, 20 6 evidence of his
net worth has a direct bearing on the issues at trial. Accord-
ingly, Louisiana permits discovery of net worth. 7 How-
ever, should the defendant stipulate that he will not raise the
defense of inability to pay, discovery of net worth becomes
irrelevant and impermissible.20 8
Not only do courts require plaintiffs to toe the strict line
of relevance before permitting discovery of net worth, they
frequently place a protective web around the discovery when
they do grant it.209 The entire concept of utilizing net worth
in the proof of punitive damages has brought criticism from
jurists210 and commentators2 I alike, and this renders prob-
202. Klein v. Henry S. Miller Residential Servs., 82 F.R.D. 6, 9-10 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
203. Hawes v. C.E. Cook & Co., 64 F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Mich. 1974). The court
used not only the relevance analysis in permitting discovery, but also found the mate-
rial was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 64
F.R.D. at 28.
204. Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 29 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
205. Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 455 F. Supp. 781, 792 (D.D.C. 1978).
206. Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898).
207. Guy v. Tonglet, 379 So. 2d 744 (La. 1980).
208. Id at 746-47.
209. See supra notes 181, 183, 193, 196, 201, 202 & 208.
210. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975).
211. Note, The Use of Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive Damages in New
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able increased protective orders in prejudgment discovery in
this area. Courts show themselves amenable to restricting
discovery solely to opposing counsel,21 2 to bifurcating dis-
covery by prohibiting any discovery relating to net worth
until the jury has handed down a special verdict finding the
right to punitive damages, 213 to requiring a prima facie
showing that a jury should grant punitive damages before
ordering discovery, 214 to permitting discovery but then hold-
ing it under seal until the plaintiffs demonstrate a factual ba-
sis for their claim 215 and to limiting the scope of material
subject to discovery upon a showing of good cause.216
Courts dislike discovery of financial worth.
It seems a rare instance indeed that the potential of disclo-
sure for purposes unrelated to the lawsuit or to persons
other than counsel and their representatives serves any
purpose except to give a tactical edge to the party who has
obtained discovery of the information by allowing that
party the benefit of pressure in settlement negotiations by
threat or implication of disclosure.21 7
At the same time, courts acknowledge its necessity. State-
ments by a defendant of his net worth, even under oath, will
not provide an acceptable substitute for full discovery.218 By
extrapolation, then, statements obtained from private inves-
tigators or from private financial rating services cannot sub-
stitute for the rigors of discovery. "The search for forgotten
or hidden assets is of the essence of the discovery process. '21 9
Accordingly, courts balance this need for discovery before
trial against negative elements inherent in the discovery and
York: Rupert v. Sellers, 44 ALB. L. REV. 422 (1980); Note, Exemplary Damages in the
Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 528 (1957). But see Comment, Punitive Damages
and the Admissibility of Evidence of Wealth, 29 ALA. L. REv. 564 (1978).
212. Richards v. Superior Ct., 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81
(1978).
213. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975). But see Cobb v.
Superior Ct., 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 548, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1979).
214. Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 (1962); Campen v.
Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981).
215. Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
216. Ernst & Ernst v. Reedus, 260 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
217. Richards v. Superior Ct., 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81
(1978).
218. Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979); Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d
1347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
219. Donahue v. Hebert, 355 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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fashion proper protective orders while permitting disclosure
of the information.20
B. After Judgment
In contrast to the strict rule prohibiting prejudgment dis-
covery of net worth without a stringent showing of rele-
vance, postjudgment discovery proceeds in virtually all
cases. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as
many state rules, expressly permit a judgment creditor to
discover the assets his debtor has available to satisfy his
claim.221 Stemming from the discovery annexed to the com-
mon-law creditor's bill 222 or, alternatively, from the later de-
velopment of a supplemental proceeding in aid of
execution, 223 discovery at both federal and state levels per-
mits broad latitude to the judgment creditor seeking assets
220. If plaintiffs were allowed unlimited discovery of defendants' financial re-
sources in cases where there is no factual basis for an award of punitive dam-
ages, the personal and private financial affairs of defendants would be
unnecessarily exposed and, in some cases, the threat of such exposure might be
used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to coerce settlements from- innocent
defendants.
Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1979).
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a); ALA. R. Civ. P. 69; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 69; ARiz. R.
Civ. P. 69; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-901 (1979); CAL. Civ. P. CODE § 714 (Deering
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-397 (West 1982); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.560; IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 69; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 73 (Smith-Hurd 1982); IND. R. TRIAL P.
69(E) & IND. CODE § 34-1-44-1 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 630.1 (West Supp.
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2419 (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 69.03; LA. CODE CIV. PROc.
ART. 2451 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3122 (1964); MD. R'P. 628; MASS. R.
Civ. P. 69; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6104 (West Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. R.
Civ. P. 69; Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.27; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-14-101 (1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1564 (1981); NEV. R. Civ. P. 69(a); N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:59-1(e), 6:7-2(a);
N.M. R. Civ. P. 69; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5223 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-352 (1981); N.D. R. Civ. P. 69; OHIO R. Civ. P. 69; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 842 (West 1982); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 23.710, 23.720 (1981); PA. R. CIrv. P. 3117; R.I.
R. Civ. P. 69; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-310 (Law. Co-op. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 15-6-69, 15-20-1 (1982); TENN. R. Civ. P. 69; UTAH R. Civ. P. 69(k); VT. R.
Crv. P. 69; VA. CODE § 8.01-506 (1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 6.32.010 (1982);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-5-1 (1982); Wis. STAT. § 816.03-.11 (1981-1982); Wyo. R.
Civ. P. 69.
222. "In addition to reaching assets not reached by the legal writs, the creditor's
bill also provided a method for discovering hidden assets. The bill commonly pro-
vided a method for discovery of all the debtor's property, and the debtor and others
might be examined to uncover assets." D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 90 (2d ed. 1982).
223. Id at 96-97.
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with which to satisfy his or her judgment.224 Federal and
state courts follow essentially the same procedure in permit-
ting discovery, although some states require the return of a
writ of execution showing no property found by the sher-
iff225 and some only permit discovery in open court.226 In
contrast, the federal practice allows discovery at any time
227and in any manner.
Whatever minor differences may exist in time and man-
ner of discovery, all courts agree that plaintiffs enjoy a broad
scope of questioning once they have received a judgment, so
long as the information elicited pertains to assets of the judg-
ment debtor which the plaintiff can reach to satisfy the judg-
ment.228 Third parties as well as the judgment debtor stand
subject to deposition if they know any facts relating to possi-
ble resources of the debtor.229 Postjudgment discovery exists
to afford access to the financial resources of the debtor,
whether overt or concealed, 230 and the intertwining of corpo-
rate and personal business affairs will not defeat the right to
discover the petsonal assets of the debtor even if disclosure
of assets not subject to levy will also emerge.231 In sum, the
judgment creditor has virtually no limit to an inquiry into
224. See 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 179, § 3014.
225. Evidently, the rule in these states derived from the creditor's bill. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANNi. § 30-901 (1979).
226. These states may have taken their rules from the practice of supplemental
proceedings. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 69(b); CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 714 (West
1982).
227. After a number of cases questioned whether only depositions could satisfy
its requirements, see, e.g., M. Lowenstein & Sons v. American Underwear Mfg. Co.,
11 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Pa. 1951), the rule was amended in 1970 to provide that the
creditor could obtain discovery "in the manner provided in these rules or in the man-
ner provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held." FED. R.
Civ. P. 69(a). As practice varies only in minor degree beyond these exceptions, this
article will consider primarily federal examples and assume their application in state
cases. But see Conrad v. McMechen, 338 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (de-
lineating a difference between proceedings under statutes and those under rules).
228. Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 12 F.R.D. 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), aft'd 197 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); Caisson
Corp. v. County West Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
229. Davis Acoustical Corp. v. Skulnik, 131 N.J. Super. 87, 328 A.2d 633 (1974).
Of course, they need divulge nothing about their own personal assets during this dis-
covery. Burak v. Scott, 29 F. Supp. 775 (D.D.C. 1939).
230. Ash v. Arnold, 115 Ariz. 462, _, 565 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Ct. App. 1977).
231. Caisson Corp. v. County West Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 334 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
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the debtor's assets other than relevance and undue harass-
ment.232 Courts regard this discovery as so necessary that
claims of privilege which fall short of constitutional magni-
tude will not defeat it.233
Courts have believed that without the protection of the
discovery process a judgment debtor could so readily con-
ceal assets as to render the judgment a hollow victory.
Since the remedy against the property of the debtor is now
almost entirely deprived of the auxiliary coercion, intended
by the arrest and imprisonment of his person, the creditor's
naked claim against the property ought to receive the most
effective support, and every rule calculated to prevent the
debtor from secreting or masking it to be sustained with
fortitude and vigor.23a
Thus, through the mechanism of broad discovery permitted
after a judgment, courts provide against the danger of a
debtor frustrating the judgment by secreting assets.235 In
other words, the express purpose of postjudgment discovery
is to assure that once a plaintiff recovers a judgment he will
be able to satisfy it.
C Discovery Before Election of Defendants
Plaintiffs sue the undisclosed principal as well as the con-
tracting agent because courts have given them access to the
party who instigated the contract as well as the party who
effectuated it in order to maximize the possibility of recovery
for the innocent plaintiffs.236 Courts permit plaintiffs discov-
ery of the net worth of their defendants with great freedom
after judgment in order to maximize the possibility of recov-
ery on the judgment.237 Thus, while the same theory under-
232. "[The inquiry must be kept pertinent to the goal of discovering concealed
assets of the judgment debtor and not be allowed to become a means of harassment of
the debtor or third persons." Id at 334.
233. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 422 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga.
1976), aftd, 544 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1977).
234. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 419 (DaCapo reprint 1971)
(Ist ed. 1827).
235. See, e.g., United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1967);
Ranney-Brown Distribs. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977);
Davis Acoustical Corp. v. Skulnik, 131 N.J. Super. 87, 328 A.2d 633 (1974).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 30-47.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
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lies postjudgment discovery and suit against undisclosed
principals, the plaintiff who discovers subsequent to making
an election that he has picked the wrong defendant to pursue
has gained his information far too late in the game to aid
hiM. 2 3 8
At the same time, traditional principles governing dis-
covery before judgment would seem to bar discovery for the
purpose of effectuating a meaningful election. Unless the
discovery bears some relevance to an issue likely to arise at
the trial of the action, courts will not permit it.239 Only by
straining the concept of relevance can the issue of election of
defendants fit the traditional rubric permitting discovery of
net worth. Courts require an election because, as some state,
liability in a contractual setting is several but not joint.24
Thus, the issue of which of the two defendants must suffer a
judgment has no bearing on their liability at law. Similarly,
the time of election does not come during the trial proper,
but rather during pretrial proceedings or subsequent to the
actual rendition of the verdict by the jury.
Courts, however, insist that a plaintiff have an opportu-
nity to elect in a meaningful manner.2 41 Thus, if they would
view election not as an issue presented at trial but as an issue
independently inherent in the case, discovery of the net
worth of the two defendants would bear directly on the issue
of the meaningful nature of the election. Not only must the
plaintiff know he has a cause of action against the undis-
closed principal before he must make his election, he must
also know with some reasonable accuracy which of the de-
fendants presents the better target to satisfy a judgment.
Viewed in this light, the issue of net worth is of the highest
relevance to the prosecution of the plaintiff's action.
Alternatively, courts could abandon their traditional ru-
bric of relevance and acknowledge that since discovery must
foster the goal of achieving justice in litigation,242 to bar dis-
238. See, e.g., Grinder v. Bryans Rd. Bldg. & Supp. Co., 290 Md. 687, _, 432
A.2d 453, 464 (1981).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
241. See supra note 129.
242. "Modem instruments of discovery... make a trial less a game of blind
man's buff [sic] and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
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covery in this instance would effectively arrive at an unjust
result. Courts cannot extend the salutary assistance of
postjudgment discovery only to block a plaintiff from ever
reaching it by requiring him to abandon a legitimate claim
against a defendant before even prosecuting it to judgment.
One can hardly create a remedy while at the same time
blocking all possible access to it.
Admittedly, discovery of net worth will not solve the
problem in many instances.243 Clearly, discovery before
judgment will matter little in those jurisdictions which hold
that the very maintenance of a cause of action against one
potential party constitutes an election.2" Similarly, where a
defendant may move to require an election at the very filing
of a joint action, the plaintiff will not have the opportunity to
avail himself of the discovery process. 245 One can hardly use
a procedure unique to litigation if one is barred from that
litigation ab initio.
Practical considerations will also render discovery of re-
duced value. Frequently, in the time between the discovery
and the rendition of final judgment, the financial position of
the elected defendant may change so drastically as to render
him judgment proof. In these instances, all the discovery
measures available to a plaintiff will prove of little value.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many courts permit a plaintiff to recover a judgment
against a master and servant jointly, while prohibiting a
judgment against an undisclosed principal and his agent.
No sound doctrinal consideration supports mandatory elec-
tion, yet courts stubbornly cling to the outmoded and unsuit-
able rule of the Restatements. Since the cause of action
against the undisclosed principal came into being specifically
to afford the widest possible range of options to the ag-
grieved third party, any rule of procedure which unjustifi-
fullest practicable extent." United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958).
243. Cf Grinder v. Bryans Rd. Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687, _, 432 A.2d
453, 464 (1981).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42.
245. See, e.g., Dinkier Mgmt. Corp. v. Stein, 115 Ga. App. 586, 155 S.E.2d 442
(1967).
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ably curtails the remedies available in this cause of action
has no basis in either theory or practice. The law can hardly
give with one hand while blocking access to the gift with the
other. Accordingly, those courts requiring election of de-
fendants should reconsider their positions and reverse them-
selves. If the American Law Institute promulgates a third
Restatement of Agency, it should reject the election doctrine
in favor of the theoretically sound view permitting a plaintiff
to obtain a joint judgment against both the undisclosed prin-
cipal and the agent, while recovering but a single
satisfaction.
Alternatively, states clinging to the election doctrine
should permit plaintiffs to make meaningful choices. They
should allow plaintiffs access to discovery of the net worth of
their defendants before any election. To avoid any undue
advantage to the plaintiff seeking to use this information im-
properly, courts can fashion protective restrictions on the
discovery process.246 For example, courts may require de-
fendants to comply with this discovery only upon their mo-
tions to have the plaintiff elect between them. Even then, the
discovery may proceed in camera, and only the attorney for
the plaintiff should have access to the information. Close
monitoring of the type of discovery and restrictions on those
items which the plaintiff may photocopy will also go far to-
ward protecting the rights of the defendants. These protec-
tive measures should effectively balance the privacy of the
defendants with the need of the plaintiff to make an in-
formed election and, at the same time, keep as even as possi-
ble the competitive position of the litigants.
The doctrine of election contains the potential for a seri-
ous miscarriage of justice. Courts should reject it. Failing
this, they should adopt measures to minimize its severity.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 209-16.
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